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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
App. Case No. 20101004CA 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to §78A-4-103(2) et. seq. of the Utah Code 
Annotated, in that this is a case that was transferred from the Utah Supreme 
Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. This matter is an appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court final order wherein the Supreme Court had original 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The District Court erred by: I. The court did not properly review and 
improperly ruled that the petitioner was in contempt of court for failing to pay the 
medical insurance premium on behalf of the Respondent when it was the 
Respondent's fault for taking the money out of the account used to pay the 
insurance; II. The Court erred by awarding alimony to the Respondent in the 
form of retaining the marital home with more than at least $50,000.00 in equity 
therein, and by ordering the petitioner to pay all of her medical bills of over 
$4000.00 without applying the Jones factors; III. The award of Respondent's 
attorney's fees were improper; IV. The Respondent should have been held in 
contempt for her failure to file bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to 
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the September, 2009 court order, for failing to pay the second mortgage, and 
failing to list the home for sale; and for the equity in the home not being divided. 
These issues have been reserved for appeal because a final written ruling 
against Appellant took effect on November 15, 2010, and a timely appeal was 
filed on December 14, 2010. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Appellate Courts review a District Court's findings "for correctness, 
according them [the District Court] no particular deference." Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court also held that, "Trial 
courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. 
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous 
standard. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, 
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." State of Utah v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (1994). 
The standard of review in contempt matters are to be made by clear and 
convincing evidence in a civil contempt proceeding. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings 
therein are contempts of the authority of the court: ... 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court. 
§ 30-4-1. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE: Action by spouse-Grounds 
Whenever a resident of this state: 
(1) Deserts a spouse without good and sufficient cause; 
(2) Being of sufficient ability to provide support, neglects or refuses 
to properly provide for and suitably maintain that spouse; 
(3) having property within this state and the spouse being a 
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resident of this state, so deserts or neglects or refuses to provide such support; 
or 
(4) where a married person without that person's fault lives 
separate and apart from that spouse, the district court shall, on the filing of a 
complaint, allot, assign, set apart and decree as alimony the use of real and 
personal estate or earnings of the deserting spouse as the court may determine 
appropriate. During the pendency of the action, the court may require the 
deserting spouse to pay a sum as provided in Section 30-3-3. 
C T A T p ^ A C M T H C T U C T A O C O i n i E- . IV I I_ . IN i \«/i i i IL_ o/-i \ jPL-
The Petitioner, a 72 year old retired person with severe diabetes and 
health problems, at the initial protective order hearing in March, 2008, was forced 
out of the marital home. Mr. Summer had found out the Respondent was 
committing adultery. The Petitioner had no place to live nor money for rent, so he 
moved in with his son in Idaho. The protective order against him was disputed 
but was granted. At the initial divorce hearing in June, 2008 the court did not 
award alimony, but required Mr. Summer to continue to pay the marital bills. 
Before the June 2008 hearing, Ms. Summer took a significant amount of 
money from the joint account of the parties, and Mr. Summer could not pay all of 
the bills. The health insurance coverage of Ms. Summer was cancelled before 
the June 2008 hearing. 
At the November, 2008 hearing on Mr. Summer's contempt for not 
maintaining the insurance coverage, the court told Mr. Summer to make his "best 
efforts" to reinstate the policy. Mr. Summer tried to reinstate the insurance but 
the insurance company would not reinstate her. Mr. Summer was held in 
contempt, and sent to jail by Judge Henroid twice. Mr. Summer did not have the 
money to pay the insurance bill after the Respondent took it out of their joint 
account before the court ordered him to pay the bills, and as such should not 
have been held in contempt. 
Further, the court held that Mr. Summer did not pay the medical insurance 
out of spite, and that although the insurance was dropped before the court order, 
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the court held he violated the order. 
Alimony never should have been awarded to the Respondent. The 
Petitioner, Mr. Summer is on a fixed income. His financial declaration clearly 
showed he could not pay all of the bills. He did not have money to rent his own 
place, and was sleeping on his son's couch. The court did not properly go 
through the factors of Respondent's need, the Petitioner's ability to pay, the fault 
of the parties in the divorce, nor the standard of living that is critical in making an 
alimony award. 
The Court totally ignored it's own order on hearing dated September 24, 
2009, wherein it awarded no alimony, the Petitioner was not to pay any of the 
marital debt, and each party pay their own ongoing expenses and 
encumbrances. The reason for this was that there was not enough money to pay 
the bills. The Petitioner was using credit card debt over and above his retirement 
income and social security money to pay marital and other credit card debts. The 
court ordered the parties to look into filing for bankruptcy. In return for this the 
Respondent was awarded the marital home. 
After the Petitioner filed for bankruptcy, the Respondent refused, and she 
was left with her debt. Ignoring his own order, the court ordered Mr. Summer to 
pay much of the Respondent's debt, including attorney's fees. 
Attorney's fees should not have been awarded because Mr. Summer 
could not afford them; it was not contemplated in the September 24, 2009 
agreement and order; the fact that Ms. Summer has significantly more assets 
than Mr. Summer; and that the fees were unreasonable. 
None of the attorney's fees should have been incurred because of the 
September 24, 2009 agreement and order. There should not have been a trial, 
there should not have been contempt. Because the agreement was that Ms. 
Summer got the home, Mr. Summer did not have to pay any of the bills past or 
future. 
The Respondent should have been held in contempt for failing to file 
bankruptcy; for not paying the second mortgage; and for not listing the home for 
7 
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sale, all court orders. The court dismissed the repeated requests for 
Respondent's contempt. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 7, 2008, the Petitioner filed this divorce case in the Third Judicial 
District Court in Tooele. On May 19, 2008, the Respondent filed an Answer, and 
Motion for Temporary Relief. The matter was heard before Commissioner 
Michelle Tack on June 9, 2008, wherein Mr. Summer's attorney withdrew due to 
a conflict, and his brother appeared on behalf of Mr. Summer. (Trial Transcript 
Record (hereinafter TTR)(June 9, 2008-page 1 et. Seq. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court recommended that the 
Respondent remain in the home, and the Petitioner (who is retired on a fixed 
income) was to pay the mortgage payment and service the other debts. 
Temporary alimony was denied, and mediation was ordered. (TTR June 9, 
2008)-page 16-paras 19-25; Page 17-paras 1-13). 
Before the June 9, 2008 hearing and order, and before the parties were 
separated, they shared a joint account. The bills were paid out of that joint 
account. When it was time to pay the medical insurance in April, 2008, before 
the June 9, 2008, order, the Respondent in March, 2008 took out $465.00 from 
the account, and did not put in the monthly amount of $739.00 which was 
normally put in the account for their son's disability check. (TTR February 10, 
2009)-page 14-paras 23-25; Page 15-paras 1-25; Page 16-paras 1-25; Page 
17-para 1; Page 26-paras 9-16; Page 31-paras 4-25). (Also See Affidavit of 
Ellery Summer Objection to Order to Show Cause -paras 2a~2h with 
attachments(ln court file)). 
Mr. Summer's attorney tried to explain to the court on numerous 
occasions that Mr. Summer was being tried for a contempt that was never 
ordered at the time it alleged, but was ignored by the court. (TTR February 10, 
2009)-page 21-paras 10-15). (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute Entry-Attached; No 
Transcript Found). 
The court concluded that Mr. Summers was in contempt of Court for 
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failing to make the insurance payment. The court said that "I don't need to have 
anything else." The court held Mr. Summers in contempt even after stating that, 
"This is one of those cases where there's not enough money to go around." 
The court concluded that the home should be sold, that it was the party's 
only asset, and the parties are going to have to learn how to live on very little. 
(TTR February 10, 2009)-page 32-paras 10-22). (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute 
Entry-Attached; No Transcript Found). 
The court then cuffed Mr. Summers, sentenced him to 30 days in jail, and 
fined him $1000.00. (TTR February 10, 2009)-page 33-paras 1-25). The court 
subsequently uncuffed Mr. Summer, if he would promise to put Ms. Summer 
back on the insurance policy. (TTR February 10, 2009)-page 34-paras 1-22; 
Page35-paras 1-21). 
The Court did put Mr. Summers in jail for the non-existent contempt at the 
hearing on June 8, 2009. (Also See June 8, 2009 Minute Entry-Attached; No 
Transcript Found). 
Although Mr. Summer agreed to put Ms. Summer back on the insurance 
policy, he neither had the money to do so, nor would the insurance company 
allow it. (See Affidavit of Ellery Summer Objection to Order to Show Cause -
paras 2a-2h with attachments(ln Court file)) 
On April 6, 2009, an Order to Show Cause was issued, which was 
continued without date, because counsel for the Petitioner did not receive notice 
of the hearing. On July 13, 2009, a telephonic hearing was held before Judge 
Henroid. The Court heard argument regarding the reinstatement of the 
respondent's health insurance. Notwithstanding the Petitioner's best efforts, the 
Respondent had to perform a number of tasks and fill out and send paperwork to 
the insurance agent. She failed to do so. (See Affidavit of Ellery Summer of June 
2009 with Attachments-ln court file). (TTR July 13, 2009)-page 3-paras-11-25; 
Page4-paras 1-14). 
As stated in Mr. Summer's Affidavit: 
2. That in response to the Respondent Order to Show Cause I 
state the following: 
9 
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February 8, 2010)-page 4-paras 7-2; Page 5-paras 1-16). 
It was explained that the Cadillac check was tendered to the Respondent 
at the September 24, 2009 hearing, and she had the obligation to cash it or 
obtain a newly dated check. (TTR February 8, 2010)-pages 6-paras 1-22). 
It was explained that all previous marital and medical expenses were 
waived through the September 24, 2009 stipulation and Order (styled 
"Temporary Order"). (TTR February 8, 2010)-pages 6-paras 23-25; and Page 7-
paras 1-13). It was also shown that Mr. Summer continued to pay all marital 
expenses until the September 24, 2009 Order was signed! (Id. Page 7-paras 8-
13). 
Counsel explained and evidenced all monthly retirement checks were paid 
by Mr. Summer to Ms. Summer, on time. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8-paras 
10-18). 
Counsel further explained and evidenced all reasonable efforts Mr. 
Summer provided in filing for bankruptcy. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 4-paras 
7-25; and Page 5-paras 1-16). 
Mr. Summer's counter motion alleged that Ms. Summer also did not file a 
bankruptcy case. (Countermotion in Court file). The court would not entertain 
holding Ms. Summer in contempt due to the Court's bias. The Court specifically 
stated "I start looking at these folks a little bit differently." and then went on to say 
Mr. Summer has been to jail, refused to pay, and is shaking his head. (TTR 
February 8, 2010)-page 5-paras 10-23). 
Counsel explained to the court the many reasons the hearing did not need 
to take place and the frivolous manner of it. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8-
paras 1-25). 
Counsel explained the costs and expenses incurred by Mr. Summer to 
respond to and appear at the frivolous hearing. (TTR February 8, 2010)-page 8-
paras 1-25; Page 10-paras 1-5). The Court ignored the request. 
The Court then stated that Mr. Summer was defiant, was not obedient to 
court orders, and didn't do things even when he went to jail. The Court's 
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statements are not backed up by any evidence whatsoever. (TTR February 8, 
2010)-page 17-paras 2-8). 
A hearing was then held on June 14, 2010, on Respondent's Order to 
Show Cause again, wherein the Respondent moved the court to hold Mr. 
Summer in contempt for his failure to pay bills, failure to do his bankruptcy, 
failure to deed the home to the Respondent, for cancelling the trial in September 
2009 after Respondent paid much in attorney's fees, for failure to tender the 
insurance check from a wrecked Cadillac, and for failure to pay one-half of his 
retirement to the Respondent. (In court file). 
The Petitioner proved through pleading and oral argument that there was 
a court order allowing him to stop paying all debt; that he met with a number of 
bankruptcy attorneys and took the bankruptcy education class on January 5, 
2010; that Mr. Summer had indeed filed for bankruptcy and was actually 
discharged by the June 14, 2010 hearing; that a deed to the respondent would 
not be in her best interest in that Mr. Summer would not have been able to 
tender his homestead exemption to the Respondent; that cancelling the 
September 24, 2009 trial was a stipulation between the parties and counsel and 
not a unilateral move by Mr. Summer; that there was no order to tender a quit-
claim deed due to the bankruptcy filing; that the insurance check for the Cadillac 
was actually tendered on September 24, 2009 in court, and the Respondent 
failed to cash it; and much evidence was provided showing that Mr. Summer was 
paying one-half of his retirement monthly through counsel to Ms. Summer. The 
evidence was overwhelming, and Mr. Summer requested his attorney's fees, 
costs, and expenses to come to Utah to defend against these frivolous 
pleadings. (TTR June 14, 2010)-pages 3-7). 
In fact, the Respondent should have been held in contempt for failing to 
file for bankruptcy herself, as she admitted the same through counsel. (TTR 
June 14, 2010)-page 3-paras 21-25). 
Counsel made it clear that there were no issues left before the court in the 
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divorce matter due to the September 24, 2009, stipulation and order (styled 
"Temporary Order"). (TTR June 14, 2010)-page 5-paras 15-25; Page 6-paras 1-
25; Page 7-paras 1-14). 
The Court would not follow it's own order. The Court improperly scheduled 
a trial on personal property, and debts. (TTR June 14, 2010)-page 7-paras 17-
25; and page 14-paras 3-9). 
It is troubling that the Court submitted a Memorandum Decision on 
September 15, 2010, wherein the Court states "The orders, including the 
v->epieinuc;i z-i- [^.uuc/j U I U C I , i iau u c c n picuiocucu upun l u c pcuuuiici idNt>iauiiy 
the respondent's health insurance and the Temporary Order of September 24, 
2009, is predicated on the parties filing bankruptcy." (See Memorandum 
Decision-Attached). Both statements are untrue as outlined from the above 
transcripts. 
Notwithstanding the Petitioner's objections through counsel in the June 
14, 2010 hearing, the Court held a trial on September 8, 2010. Notwithstanding 
the September 24, 2009 order resolving all issues, the Court held in it's 
Memorandum Decision on the trial, that the marital home is awarded to the 
Respondent with it's equity of $50,000.00; that Mr. Summer had excess income 
that could be paid for alimony and that the Respondent had a need (but neither 
monetary figure was outlined); that Mr. Summer is liable for every one of Ms, 
Summer's medical expenses from April 2008 forward (ad infinitum) until he 
deeds the marital home to her (these debts to be reduced to judgment); 
sanctions of $1000.00 for failing to reinstate Ms. Summer's health insurance; 
and attorney's fees awarded to Mr. Buhler for each hearing except for trial. (See 
Memorandum Decision-Attached). 
If the court was ignoring it's September 24, 2009, order, it should have 
determined a sum of alimony, divided the equity in the home, not awarded 
anything for marital or medical debt whatsoever, (it was the Respondent's own 
fault for taking the insurance premium money out of the account), and not 
awarded attorney's fees due to the Petitioner having discharged those fees in 
14 
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bankruptcy. The Petitioner should not at any time have been held in contempt of 
court. 
Lastly, the Petitioner filed a bifurcated divorce decree on October 19, 
2010, and the Respondent subsequently filed a "Bifurcated Decree of Divorce 
Concerning Assets" on November 15, 2010. The Respondent's "decree' was 
never served on Petitioner or counsel until after it was signed by the Court on 
November 15, 2010. Further, the Court held a hearing on the dueling "decrees" 
on November 15, 2010, wherein the court signed the Respondent's decree 
because the Petitioner nor counsel were present. (TTR November 15, 2010)-
pages 2-3).This was the second time that counsel and Petitioner did not receive 
notice of a hearing. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court never should have held Mr. Summer in contempt for not 
maintaining the health insurance for Ms. Summer. The evidence clearly showed 
that in March 2008, Ms. Summer took out the money out of Mr. Summer's bank 
account necessary to pay the insurance. Further, the insurance money and bills 
necessary to be paid always utilized their son's social security check. Ms. 
Summers withheld the son's social security check from Mr. Summers in March, 
2008, and he could not pay for insurance premium. 
The Court held Mr. Summers in contempt for an order of the court issued 
after the insurance was terminated. Mr. Summers could not reinstate the 
insurance, but the court continued to improperly hold him in contempt. The court 
would not take into consideration Mr. Summer's inability to pay the insurance 
premium. Further, Ms. Summer was never held in contempt for her failure to 
follow the court orders. 
The Court awarded alimony to the Respondent after finding that neither 
party had enough money to pay their bills. The court's bias against Mr. Summer, 
for whatever reason, became evident on many occasions by the court stating 
that Mr. Summer was disobedient to court orders, he has been to jail, he was 
shaking his head, and he refused to pay. 
15 
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Alimony was ordered in the form of giving the entire marital home with it's 
$50,000.00 of equity to the Respondent. The home should have been divided 
between the parties, especially since the Court chose to ignore it's own 
September 24, 2009 order and not award any alimony and all bills were not to be 
paid. The Court did not properly run through the alimony factors, and improperly 
awarded a judgment against Mr. Summer for medical expenses and debt. 
The attorney fee award was also improper due to the September 24, 
2009 order; due to Mr. Summer's Chapter Bankruptcy; and due to many of the 
hearings being frivolous on heir face. The fees were not reasonable. 
The Respondent should have been held in contempt for her failure to file 
bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to the September 24, 2009 
hearing. Her excuse was that she received advice from a bankruptcy attorney 
that it would not be in her best interest. It was never explained how it was not in 
her interest, nor why there were any grounds whatsoever that the September 24, 
2009 order should not have been followed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The court did not properly review and improperly ruled that the petitioner 
was in contempt of court for failing to pay the medical insurance premium 
on behalf of the Respondent 
The Utah Code Annotated outlines why, how, and when a party is held in 
contempt of court. It states: 
§78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings 
therein are contempts of the authority of the court: ... 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court. 
The Court specifically held Mr. Summers in contempt for his failure to 
maintain the health insurance for Ms. Summer pursuant to the June 9, 2008 
Court Order. 
Utah Appellate Courts have stated that in order to prove contempt for 
failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the 
person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability 
16 
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to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. These three 
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal 
contempt proceeding, and by clear and convincing evidence in a 
civil contempt proceeding. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 
(Utah 1988). 
Also, Appellate Courts have held that a finding of contempt and the 
imposition of a jail sentence must be supported by clear and 
convincing proof that defendant knew what was required, that he 
had the ability to comply, and that he willfully and knowingly failed 
and refused to do so. Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 
1983). 
In the present case, the insurance premium was not paid and the 
insurance was terminated before the June 9, 2008 Court Order. The evidence 
showed that Ms. Summer took the money out of the joint account which was 
used to pay the premium. Further, Ms. Summer refused to tender their son's 
social security check which was also used to pay the bills. 
Mr. Summer was 72 years old at the time. He was on social security 
himself, and had a retirement. His income alone was not enough to pay all of the 
debts and the insurance premium. Further, Mr. Summer was not under a Court 
Order to pay the insurance premium. He did not know nor could he know that he 
was under this obligation. There was no clear and convincing evidence to hold 
Mr. Summer in contempt on three occasions for failure to maintain the insurance 
policy. 
When Mr. Summer was under the obligation to try and reinstate the policy, 
he made his best efforts but was unsuccessful. Evidence was presented showing 
Ms. Summer did not comply with the requirements the insurance company 
required. 
The Court's original minute order on June 9, 2008, nor the transcript said 
anything about maintaining the health insurance for the Respondent. It was only 
after the Respondent took the money out of the Petitioner's account in March 
and April 2008, and the Petitioner could not make the health insurance payment 
and the policy was dropped, then as an afterthought on October 16, 2008, did 
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the Respondent file an Order stating that the Petitioner had to maintain the 
health insurance that was already dropped months before the June 9, 2008 
hearing. 
As such, the Petitioner was put into a position to perform without the 
ability to do so. He was improperly held in contempt, improperly sanctioned, and 
spent needless time in jail twice. 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT I 
Because the order came after the insurance was cancelled on the 
Respondent. There is nothing to marshal regarding that point. 
Based upon the representation of the Respondent's counsel, the court did 
order Mr. Summer to reinstate the insurance policy for Ms. Summer. (TTR 
November 3, 2008)-page 8-paras 9-25; and Page 9-paras 1-17). 
He was unable to do so which was evidenced in the July 13, 2009 
telephonic conference, where it was found that the Respondent had to make out 
a new application for insurance, and was trying to get the information to the 
insurance agent. (TTR July 13, 2009)-page 3-paras 10-25; Page 4-paras 1-15). 
The Petitioner and the Respondent were unable to procure a new health 
insurance policy for Ms. Summer either. 
Notwithstanding all of the best efforts of the Petitioner there is not any 
scrap of evidence to clearly convince the Court to hold Mr, Summers in 
contempt, yet he was. 
II. The Court erred by awarding alimony to the Respondent in the 
form of retaining the marital home with more than at least $50,000.00 in 
equity therein, and by ordering the petitioner to pay all of her medical bills 
of over $4000.00. 
The court held that in lieu of alimony, the Respondent was awarded the 
marital home, and all medical bills incurred by the Respondent because the 
Petitioner did not pay her insurance premium. 
In making this award, the Court did not assess the income or expenses of 
the parties with relation to the actual award. The Memorandum Decision makes 
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mention of the financial declarations, but the Findings of Fact are insufficient to 
make the award. The Court states that the Petitioner's income was $2805.00 but 
neglects to state that approximately $660.00 of that total goes to the Respondent 
as her one-half share of his retirement. The court does mention that the 
Petitioner wrongly couches a sum as alimony (when the sum was actually the 
one-half of the retirement). This puts his income at a much lower level 
notwithstanding the statement that Mr. Summers inflated his expenses in his 
sworn financial declaration. The Court did not properly assess the Petitioner's 
ability to pay, nor the Respondents need. 
Also, the Court never made mention of the fault of the Respondent in the 
divorce. Evidence was put on regarding the Respondent committing adultery 
while the parties were together. This was the reason Mr. Summer filed for the 
divorce. He was the Petitioner. 
Finally, alimony was eliminated in the September 24, 2009, Order, and 
should never have been resurrected. 
Further, there was no basis for ordering the Petitioner to pay the 
Respondent's medical bills when he clearly could not afford them, he was not 
responsible for the insurance being cancelled, and the September 24, 2009 
order clearly stated he would not have to pay them. These promises within the 
Court Order were the reasons Mr. Summer filed for Bankruptcy. 
The Respondent should have also been relieved of her debts because 
both parties agreed to file bankruptcy, and there was a court order reflecting the 
agreement. The Petitioner relied upon the agreement and the order to file for 
bankruptcy believing that all of the debts would be discharged. 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT II 
The Court states in it's Memorandum Decision that the September 24, 
2009 Order was predicated upon Petitioner reinstating the Respondent's health 
insurance, and that the same order was also predicated upon the Respondent 
filing for bankruptcy. (Page 3 of the Memorandum Decision). 
The September 24, 2009 order was styled "Temporary Order" which could 
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mean alimony, the marital home, and marital debts may still be on the table if 
the parties do not file for bankruptcy. It could also be read in the order itself that 
the parties were not formally ordered to file bankruptcy, because it states, "2. As 
it is clear the parties do not make enough money to pay the marital debt, the 
parties are to look into filing a bankruptcy as soon as feasibly possible." The term 
"look into", could be construed as just research into it. 
Unfortunately, reading the entire order in context should not give one the 
impression that filing bankruptcy was discretionary. Further the transcript of the 
hearing made clear that it was a temporary order so the Petitioner could claim 
the homestead exemption so the bankruptcy trustee would abandon the home 
as an asset, or that he would give the exemption money to the Respondent after 
he was discharged. Both parties agreed to this taking the risk with their equity, 
the Respondent with the home and the Petitioner with his car. (TTR September 
24, 2009)-page 2-paras 19-25; and Page 3-paras 1-25). 
Both parties agreed to all of these terms in open court. (TTR September 
24, 2009)-page 5-paras 1-15). Even looking at every scrap of evidence in favor 
of the Memorandum Decision, there is not sufficient evidence to support the 
ruling. 
ill. The award of Respondent's attorney's fees were improper. 
Although attorney fee awards are under the discretion of the trial court, 
they are clearly erroneous without specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 
stating 1. The need of the party requesting fees; 2. The ability of the other party 
to pay the fees; and 3. The reasonableness of the fees. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 
852 P.2d 1025 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (1988); and Endrodv 
v. Endrodv, 914 P.2d 1166 (1996) 
1. The Court's Memorandum Decision and the Decree of Divorce do not 
state any findings or conclusions with regard to attorney's fees. The Court did not 
go through the award of attorney's fees based upon need, the ability to pay, or 
that a fee award was reasonable. 
The only allusion to Petitioner's fault was the finding of contempt for his 
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failure to maintain the Respondent's health insurance, even though the order 
came several months after the insurance was dropped because of the 
Respondent's own actions. If the Court can ferret out some findings from the 
Order, they are still improper. After the Petitioner gives one-half of his retirement 
to the Respondent (which he continues to do), their income is within $500.00 of 
each other. Mr. Summer would have income in the amount of $2155.00, and Ms. 
Summer of $1619.00. 
The Court found that Mr. Summer's Financial declaration was wrong. It 
found that he undervalued his rent by $550.00, and overvalued the rest of his 
expenses by $1000.00. This leaves a net overvaluation of $450.00. Even if the 
court was correct in it's overvalue assumption, clearly he has no discretionary 
income to pay attorney's fees. This is exactly the reason the Court awarded the 
Respondent the marital home in lieu of alimony, because Mr. Summer had no 
discretionary income. 
The Court found Ms. Summer's expenses reasonable at $2033.00. She 
has income of at least $1619.00. She would have difficulty paying her expenses 
unless she did a bankruptcy which would likely lower her expenses as 
contemplated by the September 2009 hearing. 
Finally, there are no findings regarding the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees. Mr. Buhler outlined his fee affidavit, but there are no findings 
regarding they being reasonable. The Court held a hearing, without giving 
Petitioner or his counsel notice, whereby the Respondent's decree was signed 
awarding fees, without detailing if they were reasonable. As such, all attorney's 
fees are improper. 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT III 
If as stated above the Petitioner violated the Court's Order to maintain and 
reinstate the health insurance of the Respondent, then he may be responsible 
for some attorney's fees. Because there is not any evidence to suggest that he 
was in contempt, fees are improper. 
Further, There is no evidence presented that Mr. Summer could afford the 
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fees, or that they were reasonable. The need of the Respondent for the fees 
may have been satisfied with a cursory review of her financial declaration as 
outlined partially in the Memorandum Decision, but the figures delineating the 
need were not presented. 
If the Respondent followed the order and did her bankruptcy, she would 
not have the debt nor the need. The Respondent had the bulk of the assets in 
the marital home. 
Finally, the September 24, 2009 hearing clearly stated that each party 
pays LI iSsr costs and expenses in the divorce, which should obviate the need to 
award attorney's fees. (TTR September 24, 2009)-page 4-paras 12-13). 
IV. The Respondent should have been held in contempt for her 
failure to file bankruptcy and discharge her debts pursuant to the 
September, 2009 court order. 
In September 2009, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered the parties 
to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy either together if they could or separately, if 
necessary. This was agreed to and ordered because of the impossible debt load 
the parties held. 
After some research and meetings with several bankruptcy attorneys, the 
Petitioner filed in Idaho, his place of residence. The Respondent never filed, in 
violation of the Court Order. The Respondent's excuse was that it was at the 
advice of her bankruptcy attorney that she not file. The Respondent did not act 
reasonably when she followed the advice of the bankruptcy attorney. Further, the 
Respondent should have sought leave of court to amend or change the order 
that the parties shall file for bankruptcy. The Petitioner relied upon the 
agreement and court order to his detriment. Once the Petitioner's debts were 
discharged, the Respondent used his discharge as a weapon against him 
claiming that he had little debt and she was under a greater burden of debt. This 
skewed the courts review in the final trial. 
As such the Respondent should be held in contempt, and the decree 
should be reversed and remanded to take into consideration the new lack of debt 
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on the Respondent's ledger. 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE ON POINT IV 
As stated previously, if it can be shown that the September 24, 2009 order 
was not an order but a suggestion, then the Respondent would not be in 
contempt. 
Further, it could also be argued that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing can only 
be ordered through an involuntary petition in the bankruptcy court itself, as it is 
under the federal jurisdiction. If this is the case then the District Court Order 
could be nullified by the federal rules. 
The difference is that Ms. Summer agreed in open court on September 
24, 2009 to do a bankruptcy because it was determined that both parties could 
not service their debt. (TTR September 24, 2009)-page 2-paras 19-25; and Page 
3-paras 1-25). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Summer maintains that he was never in contempt of the Court's 
Orders at any time, yet was held in contempt three times, and twice was put in 
jail overnight. Mr. Summer contends that his contempt was caused by Ms. 
Summer's own actions and the bias of the court. 
Mr. Summer also maintains that the September 24, 2009, Order was 
comprehensive agreement between the parties and should have been upheld as 
the order of the court. As such, no other hearings should have taken place, he 
should not have been held in contempt after that for failing to pay marital debt 
and have to pay medical debt. Also, Ms. Summer should have been held in 
contempt for failing to file for bankruptcy. 
Given that the September Order was the final order for purposes of 
finishing up this case, Mr. Summer should not have to pay any attorney's fees 
and the Respondent should have to pay his fees. 
Also, in the alternative, if the court did properly look at the September 24, 
2009 order as temporary for purposes of holding a trial, the court erred by not 
dividing the home equity, and by awarding alimony when the Petitioner did not 
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have the ability to pay alimony.
 c~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ _ day of July, 2011. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
j^M*4 
JayJL Kessler, Attorney for Appellant 
( / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / Q day of July, 2011, I sent via hand-
delivery or United States Mail two copies of the foregoing Appellant Brief to the 
following: 
Gary A. Buhler, Esq. 
291 North Race Street 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
Lj(fi4s\ -
L. Kessler 
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ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
A. Court's Memorandum Decision. 
B. June 8, 2009 Minute Entry. 
C. September 24, 2009 Temporary Order. 
D. Petitioner's Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
E. Respondent's Bifurcated Decree of Divorce Concerning Assets. 
F. Respondent's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Divorce Decree. 
G. Respondent's Order and Judgment. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT °epuiyci< 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY B. SUMMER, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 084300208 
vs. : 
MARY P. SUMMER, : 
Respondent. : 
This matter was tried on September 8, 2010. Petitioner was present 
and represented by Jay L. Kessler, and respondent was present and 
represented by Gary A. Buhler. 
The Petition for Divorce was filed May 7, 2008. The history of 
hearings, rulings and Orders in this case is particularly important and 
therefore is recited here. On June 9, 2008, respondent's Motion for 
Temporary Relief was heard by Commissioner Michelle Tack. Petitioner was 
represented by Jacob Linares and then Joel Linares, and respondent was 
represented by Gary Buhler. The Commissioner's recommendation was that 
the respondent remain in the marital home with the dependent adult child. 
Petitioner was to maintain the first and second mortgage payments, all 
the marital debt payments,"temporary alimony was not awarded. The Order 
of Temporary Relief was entered October 16, 2008, and specifically 
stated: NNUntil further Order of this Court, in lieu of cash alimony 
payments, Ellery shall continue to timely pay the first and second 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER . PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
mortgages, he shall maintain all insurance policies existing at the time 
of the parties' separation, and he shall continue to timely pay all of 
the marital bills he has been paying," listing 18 specific bills. 
On November 3, 2008, a hearing was held before Commissioner Tack 
because Mr. Summer had elected not to pay the premium to maintain the 
respondent's health insurance. Mr. Summer had retired as a State 
employee, with the benefit of being able to maintain PEHP insurance for 
himself and his spouse, until either of them became eligible for 
Medicare. Mr. Summer paid the bills ordered in the October 8 Order, with 
the exception of the health insurance premium. He specifically paid all 
the obligations that benefitted him and spitefully chose to drop Ms. 
Summer from the insurance. The issue was certified for contempt and Mr. 
Summer was ordered to reinstate the insurance policy. 
On February 10, 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held. Mr. Summer 
was represented by Mr. Linares, and Ms. Summer was represented by Mr. 
Buhler, and the Court found Mr. Summer in contempt of Court for not 
paying the medical insurance premium previously ordered, and ordered him 
to serve 30 days in jail and pay a $1,000 fine for contempt. He was 
released early upon his representation that he would pay the bills 
previously ordered, reinstate"the insurance, and pay premiums that were 
due, and the balance of jail time and fine were suspended as long as the 
Orders of the Court were complied with. 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
On September 24, 2009, a hearing was held. Petitioner was 
represented by Jay L. Kessler, and respondent by Gary Buhler. The 
parties entered into a stipulation which included an award of personal 
property to the petitioner, and based upon the parties' stipulation to 
file bankruptcy, either jointly or individually, a Temporary Order was 
entered stating that no alimony would be awarded, the marital residence 
would be awarded to the respondent, that the insurance check from the 
wrecked Cadillac would be delivered to the respondent, petitioner would 
get the Dodge Dakota, and the parties would stop paying regular 
installment debt because of the pending bankruptcies. Respondent was 
awarded one-half the PEHP retirement. Mr. Kessler was to prepare a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, and petitioner was not going to pay 
the second mortgage in October of 2009. 
The Orders, including the September 24 order, had been predicated 
upon the petitioner reinstating the respondent's health insurance and the 
Temporary Order of September 24, 2009, is predicated on the parties both 
filing bankruptcy. Mr. Summer filed bankruptcy in the state of Idaho. 
The parties were unable to file bankruptcy jointly because Ms. Summer is 
a resident of Tooele County, Utah, and she elected not to file bankruptcy 
on the advice of her bankruptcy lawyer. 
Mr. Summer never reinstated Ms. Summer's health insurance. It 
appears that it was impossible after the insurance was terminated for Mr. 
Summer's refusal to pay the premium and PEHP would not reinstate that. 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER PAGE .4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
It is noteworthy that Mr. Summer never tried to pay the past-due premiums 
in connection with any action attempting to get the insurance reinstated. 
It is impossible to overstate the gravity of the injury caused to 
the respondent by Mr. Summer's intentional and spiteful actions resulting 
in the termination of her insurance. At the present time, she is a 61-
year-old person who cannot afford health insurance. Mr. Summer is 74-
years-old and is covered by Medicare. 
A hearing was held on February 8, 2010, at which time neither party 
had filed bankruptcy, petitioner had stopped paying the marital debt, and 
the Court set the case for trial on March 31, 2010. Petitioner filed a 
Motion to Cancel the Trial, claiming that there were no issues because 
he had now filed his bankruptcy pleading, and that all other matters were 
resolved. 
It turned out that those matters were not resolved, in part because 
the respondent did not file bankruptcy, and a hearing was held June 14, 
2010, to again set a trial date. At that time, the Court heard 
jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce. 
All remaining issues were tried on September 8, 2010. 
Mr. Summer submitted petitioner's Exhibit 2, a 14-page exhibit 
containing a list of personal property he contended was left in the home 
when he moved out in 2008. Respondent agreed that he could have all said 
personal property which was actually in her possession, she denied that 
all of it was in her possession. He was awarded all personal property 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER PAGE 5 . MEMORANDUM DECISION 
on Exhibit 2 currently in respondent's possession and he was given ten 
days, commencing September 9, 2010 to remove his personal property from 
her residence and he forfeits any property not removed in that ten-day 
period. 
This is a 28-year marriage. Petitioner's present income is $2,805 
from his State of Utah retirement and social security. Respondent's 
income is $1,619 per month, consisting of one-half of the petitioner's 
State retirement, her social security, and rent from the parties' 
disabled adult son. Petitioner, since separation, has resided in the 
homes of his children from a prior relationship. Respondent resides in 
the marital residence with her 84-year-old mother for whom she is a 
caretaker, with the parties' adult disabled child, who receives a social 
security stipend from which he pays the $350 per month rent, and a fourth 
party who is paid by respondent's mother to provide some care. 
Respondent may benefit to the extent that her mother's social security 
exceeds her mother's medical nursing care and ambulance bills, and may 
benefit to some small extent from food stamps received by the fourth 
person living in the home. 
Respondent's monthly expenses are set forth in respondent's Exhibit 
12, and amount to $2,033 per month and are exceedingly reasonable. Mr. 
Summer's claimed expenses are found in petitioner's Exhibit 1, his 
bankruptcy Petition at Schedule J, and they are not reasonable. They 
list one-half of his State retirement as alimony, maintenance or support, 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER PAGE 6 . MEMORANDUM DECISION 
which is wrong. His expenses are inflated for food, clothing, laundry 
and dry cleaning, transportation, renter's insurance, personal hair care 
products, services, household supplies and miscellaneous. He states $200 
for rent and he should be entitled to rent a place to live in with a 
reasonable rental of $750, which would be $550 more than his stated 
expenses, and the rest of his expenses are at least $1,000 over what he 
could actually be paying at the present time. 
Because of the parties' incomes, the length of the marriage, and the 
parties' expenses, the respondent is entitled to an award of alimony. 
The parties have a marital residence valued in the tax notice and 
also valued in Schedule A of the petitioner's bankruptcy at $165,505. 
Owed on that property is approximately $114,000, for equity (assuming the 
home could be sold for $165,500) of approximately $50,000. The 
respondent is awarded the marital residence, subject to its indebtedness, 
and is awarded a judgment requiring Mr. Summer pay every health care 
expense incurred by her from the date her health insurance terminated 
until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. The marital 
residence and the requirement that Mr. Summer pay her health care 
expenses are awards made in lieu of alimony or other marital support. 
Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional 
thirty (30) days in jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has 
never complied with the Orders of this Court by reinstating the 
respondent's insurance, he still must pay the $1,000 sanction imposed the 
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SUMMER V. SUMMER PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
first time he was held in contempt, 
Respondent is awarded attorney's fees .for each of the hearings 
detailed above, but each party shall bear their own attorney's fees for 
trial. Mr. Buhler is to prepare Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment. 
Mr. Kessler is to prepare the divorce Decree on the bifurcated divorce, 
and the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in the marital 
residence to respondent. Mr. Buhler is to prepare an Attorney Fee 
Affidavit, serve it on petitioner, and submit it to the Court after 
petitioner either responds or the time to respond has expired. 
Dated this ^0 day of September, 2010. 
STEPHEN L. Hi 
DISTRICT COU 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this_ __day of 
September, 2010: 
Jay L. Kessler 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9087 West 2700 South, Suite 9 
Magna, Utah 8 4 044 
Gary A. Buhler 
Attorney for Respondent 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
AMsica LOcchkUns 
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!ASE NUMBER 084300208 Divorce /Annulment 
6-08-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Clerk: nancyw 
PRESENT 
Petitionees Attorney: JAY L KESSLER 
Petitioner(s): ELLERY B SUMMER 
Attorney for the Respondent: GARY A BUHLER 
Respondent(s): MARY P SUMMER 
Audio 
Tape Count: 10:38 
HEARING 
COUNT: 10:38 
Mr. Buhler remarks stating the respondent did not pay the health 
insurance, or medical bills, the respondent wants the court to 
change the support order, and he wants 1/2 the insurance check from 
the accident that involved the cadillac. 
The respondent has not complied with the temporary orders, Mr. 
Buhler is also requesting attorney fees, and states his client has 
not paid on the 2nd mortgage, she does not have the info to make 
the payments. 
Mr. Kessler remarks stating the petitioner took money out of the 
account that the respondent used to pay the bills, and due to her 
actions he can't pay the bills. The respondent is uninsured, 
petitioner is also in contempt of court for not paying 2nd 
mortgage. Mr. Summers tried to pay the insurance, but PEHP denied 
the request. 
The court states he was ordered to reinstate the health insurance, 
he has not paid the utilities. He has paid the mortgage and the 
credit cards. Mr. Summers is in contempt of court and is given 
another 3 0 days for contempt for a total of 60 days jail 
Counsel will meet in chambers with the Judge. 
COUNT: 11:18 
Counsel is going to try and resolve this case before they leave 
the court house today. 
COUNT: 11:56 
Counsel is unable to reach a resolution, Mr. Summers is ordered to 
serve 24 hours in jail, from the hearing and the courts order in 
February, and from his own affidavit. Mr. Summers taken into 
custody. 
Court orders case set for telephone conference and counsel is 
encouraged to move the case along. 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/13/2009 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
ted: 12/14/10 10:33:09 Page 8 
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Jay L. Kessler (8550) 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Ellery Bruce Summer 
9087 West 2700 South 
Suite 9 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER, 
Petitioner, : TEMPORARY ORDER 
v. 
: Case No. 084300208 DA 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER, : Judge Stephen L Henroid 
Respondent. : Commissioner Michelle Tack 
PURSUANT TO the hearing held on September 24, 2009, wherein the 
parties and counsel met for trial in this matter, and given the excessive debt in 
this matter stipulated to a temporary order, and for good cause now appearing, it 
is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED 
1. Neither party is awarded alimony, and the Petitioner is relieved from 
paying any of the joint marital debt. All debts previously ordered to be paid by the 
Petitioner or Respondent are not to be paid. Each party is responsible for paying 
their ongoing expenses and new encumbrances. In return, the Respondent is 
awarded the marital home. 
2. As it is clear the parties do not make enough money to pay the marital 
debt, the parties are to look into filing a bankruptcy as soon as feasibly possible. 
Each party is to pay either one-half of the filing fee and attorney's fees for the 
bankruptcy, if filed jointly; or each party will pay their own costs and fees if filed 
separately. 
3. The Respondent is awarded the funds from the totaled joint marital car, 
the Cadillac, and the Petitioner is awarded his vehicle, the 2005 Dodge Dakota, 
3v 
^irdJudicial District 
W 2 7 200S 
TOOELE COUNTY 
DePiityCieric 
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and is responsible for the underlying encumbrance. 
4. The Respondent is entitled to one-half of the Petitioner's retirement 
earned during the course of the marriage, payable at the beginning of each 
month. The Petitioner will immediately take steps to ensure that the Respondent 
receives her share by the first of each month. Until the payment is automatically 
sent to the Respondent by the Public Safety Retirement Program, the Petitioner 
will send a check directly to her through counsel. 
5. The Petitioner will receive his personal property as agreed through 
shared lists. If Property is missing for the Petitioner, he may bring this matter 
back to the court. A peace officer or third party mover will assist in the removal of 
the Petitioner's personal property from the Respondent's residence and garage. 
6. Following the bankruptcy outcome, the parties may come back to the 
court for the final divorce. 
DATED this o& day of / \ i (K/ , 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Stephen Henroid 
BqT^pTiSED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
Approved as to form 
Gary A. Buhler 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th is^ iZ. day of October, 2009,1 sent via First 
Class United States Mail a copy of the foregoing Temporary Order to the 
following: 
Gary A. Buhler, Esq. 
291 North Race Street 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
Kessler 
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Jay L. Kessler (8550) 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Ellery Bruce Summer 
9087 West 2700 South 
Suite 9 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Telephone: (801) 252-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 252-1401 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER, 
Petitioner, : BIFURCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. : 
: Case No. 084300208 DA 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER, : Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Respondent. : Commissioner Michelle Tack 
PURSUANT TO, the hearing before Judge Stephen L. Henroid, wherein 
the Petitioner was present with counsel Jay L. Kessler, and the Respondent, was 
present with counsel Gary A. Buhler, and the court having heard argument and 
read the pleadings, and for good cause now appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED 
1. The parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to be submitted with a final order therein. 
DATED this day of October, 2010. 
BY THE COURT 
, 0 C T I 9 PH 3-U\ 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this JO day of Objection, 2010,1 sent via either 
hand-delivery and/or First Class United States Mai! a copy of the foregoing 
Bifurcated Decree of Divorce to the following: 
Gary A. Buhler, Esq. 
291 North Race Street 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
" sA^y essler 
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GARY BUHLER (7039) 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER 
Respondent. 
BIFURCATED DECREE OF 
DIVORCE CONCERNING ASSETS 
1 Case No. 084300208 DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
: On June 14, 2010, the Court heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the 
parties a bifurcated divorce. All remaining issues were tried before the Honorable Judge 
Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010. Petitioner, Ellery Summer was present in 
person and represented by his attorney Jay Kessler. Respondent Mary Paige Summer 
was present in person and represented by her attorney Gary Buhler. The Court having 
issued a Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2010 and having entered Findings of 
Fact, hereby enters the following: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. This is a 28-year marriage. Mr. Summer resides in the home of his children from a 
i 
prior relationship and has a present income is $2,805 from his State of Utah 
retirement and social security. Mrs. Summer resides the marital residence with her 
I 84-year-old mother and the parties' adult disabled child. Her present income is 
$1,619 per month, consisting of one-half of the Mr. Summer's State retirement, her 
• social security, and rent from the parties' disabled adult son. 
i 1 
/***5\ 
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2. The marital residence located at 140 County Club, Stansbury Park, valued at 
$165,505, has about $114,000 owed on the property thereby creating equity of 
approximately $50,000. 
3. In lieu of ongoing alimony, Mrs. Summer is hereby awarded the marital residence free 
from any interest to Mr. Summer, subject to its indebtedness and the possessions 
located therein except for Mr. Summer's personal property that he shall remove by 
| September 19, 2010. Any of his personal property left in the home after that date shall 
! be deemed to have been forfeited. 
4. Because Mr. Summer never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance as he had 
I 
been ordered to do several times, Mrs. Summer is awarded a judgment requiring Mr. 
Summer pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health 
! insurance terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. These 
expenses amounted to $4,400.00 at the time of trial. 
5. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her medical expenses against Ellery 
Bruce Summer in the amount of $4,400.00. 
6. Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional thirty (30) days in 
jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has never complied with the Orders 
I 
of this Court by reinstating Mrs. Summer's insurance, he still must pay the $1,000.00 
i 
sanction imposed the first time he was held in contempt. 
7. In addition to the trial of September 8, 2010, Mrs. Summer was represented by her 
attorney Gary Buhler at hearings in this matter on June 9, 2008, November 3, 2008, 
, January 12, 2009, February 10, 2009, June 8, 2009, September 24, 2009, February 
| 8, 2010, and June 14, 2010. Mrs. Summer incurred attorney's fees of no less than 
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$6,025.50 for her attorney's efforts in drafting the necessary documents before and 
after these hearings as well as the time involved in attending these hearings. 
8. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her attorney's fees against Ellery Bruce 
Summer in the amount of $ bf D7-^. • 
9. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in 
I the marital residence to Mrs. Summer within 15 days of the entry of this decree. 
tlO.The total judgment against Ellery Bruce Summer shall be augmented by ongoing 
| interest at the statutory post judgment rate until paid in full and by any and all costs of 
| collection to include Mary Page Summer's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate 
normally and reasonably charged by her attorney at the time of the collection 
expenses. 
Dated l [ \ \ ^ , 2010 BY THE COURT; 
Stephen L. Henri 
Third District CoQft) 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
Dated October 30, 2010: 
Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby 
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for 
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file 
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to 
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be 
signed and filed. 
Art 
Gary Buhler 
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GARY BUHLER (7039) 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FOR DIVORCE DECREE 
Case No. 084300208 DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The Petition for divorce was filed on May 7, 2008. On June 14, 2010, the Court 
heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce. All 
remaining issues were reserved for a later trial. These remaining issues were tried 
before the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010. Petitioner, Ellery 
Summer was present in person and represented by his attorney Jay Kessler. 
Respondent Mary Paige Summer was present in person and represented by her attorney 
Gary Buhler. The Court having issued a Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2010 
hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The history of hearings, rulings and Orders in this case is particularly important 
and is therefore recited here. 
1. On June 9, 2008, Mr. Summer's Motion for Temporary Relief was heard by 
Commissioner Michelle Tack. Mr. Summer was represented by Jacob Linares and 
then Joel Linares. Mrs. Summer was represented by Gary Buhler. The 
Commissioner's recommendation was that Mrs. Summer remain in the marital home 
1 
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with the parties' dependent adult child Christopher. Mr. Summer was ordered to 
maintain the first and second mortgage payments, all of the marital debt payments and 
based upon this order, temporary alimony was not awarded. 
2. The Order of Temporary Relief was entered October 16, 2008, and specifically stated: 
"Until further Order of this Court, in lieu of cash alimony payments, Ellery shall 
continue to timely pay the first and second mortgages, he shall maintain all insurance 
policies existing at the time of the parties' separation, and he shall continue to timely 
pay all of the marital bills he has been paying." The Order listed 18 specific bills that 
were to be paid by Mr. Summer. 
3. With the exception of the health insurance premiums for Mrs. Summer, Mr. Summer 
complied with the October 8th Order by paying of the bills as ordered. He specifically 
paid all the obligations that benefitted him and spitefully chose to drop Mrs. Summer 
from the medical insurance. 
4. On November 3, 2008, a hearing was held before Commissioner Tack concerning 
Mr. Summer's election to not pay the premium to maintain Mrs. Summer's health 
insurance. The issue was certified for contempt and Mr. Summer was ordered to 
reinstate the insurance policy for Mrs. Summer and the issues of her attorney's fees 
was reserved. 
5. On February 10, 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held. Mr. Summer was 
represented by Mr. Linares, and Mrs. Summer was represented by Mr. Buhler. The 
Court found Mr. Summer in contempt of Court for not paying the medical insurance 
premium as previously ordered, and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail and pay a 
$1,000 fine for contempt. 
2 
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6. He was released at the conclusion of the hearing upon his representation that he 
would pay the bills previously ordered, reinstate the insurance, and pay premiums 
that were due, and the balance of jail time and fine were suspended as long as Mr. 
Summer complied with the Orders of the Court. 
7. This divorce action was scheduled for trial on September 24, 2009. Mr. Summer was 
represented by Jay L. Kessler and Mrs. Summer by Gary Buhler. At that time, the 
parties entered into a stipulation that included the agreement to file bankruptcy, either 
jointly or individually and the trial was cancelled. 
8. Based upon the parties' stipulation, a Temporary Order was entered that included an 
award of personal property to Mr. Summer, to include the Dodge Dakota, and that 
awarded Mrs. Summer one-half of Mr. Summer's PEHP retirement and the marital 
residence with the attendant debts along with the provision that based upon these 
conditions, no alimony would be awarded. 
9. The Temporary Order stated that the insurance check from the wrecked Cadillac 
would be delivered to Mrs. Summer, that the parties would stop paying regular 
installment debts because of the pending bankruptcies, and acknowledged that Mr. 
Summer was not going to pay the second mortgage beginning in October 2009. 
10. The Temporary Order also stated that Mr. Kessler was to prepare a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order and he also agreed to prepare the Bifurcated Divorce 
Decree. 
11. The cancellation of the trial and the September 24th Temporary Order had been 
predicated upon Mr. Summer reinstating Mrs. Summer's health insurance and on the 
parties both filing bankruptcy. 
3 
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12. A hearing was held on Feb 8, 2010 at which time neither party had filed bankruptcy, 
Mr. Summer had stopped paying the marital debts, and the Court set the case for 
trial on March 31, 2010. 
13. On March 10, 2010, Mr. Summer filed Motion to Cancel the Trial, claiming that 
there were no remaining issues because he had by then filed his bankruptcy 
pleading, and that all other matters were resolved. It turned out that those matters 
were not resolved, in part because Mrs. Summer did not file bankruptcy, in part 
because Mr. Summer had not conveyed the marital home to Mrs. Summers and in 
part because Mr. Summer had never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance. 
14. It is impossible to overstate the gravity of the injury caused to Mrs. Summer by Mr. 
Summer's intentional and spiteful actions resulting in the termination of her 
insurance. Mr. Summer had retired as a State employee, with the benefit of being 
able to maintain PEHP insurance for himself and his spouse, until either of them 
became eligible for Medicare. At the present time, she is a s i x t y one year-old 
person who cannot afford health insurance. Mr. Summer is 74 years old and is 
covered by Medicare. 
15. It is noteworthy that Mr. Summer never tried to pay the past-due premiums in 
connection with any action attempting to get the insurance reinstated. It appears that 
because of Mr. Summer's refusal to pay the premium, PEHP would not reinstate the 
coverage after the insurance was terminated. 
16= Mr Summer filed bankruptcy in the state of Idaho. The parties were unable to file 
bankruptcy jointly because Mrs. Summer is a resident of Tooele County, Utah, and 
she elected not to file bankruptcy on the advice of her bankruptcy lawyer. 
4 
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17. A hearing was held June 14, 2010, to again set a trial date. At that time, the Court 
heard jurisdiction and grounds, and granted the parties a bifurcated divorce reserving 
all remaining issues for trial on September 8, 2010. 
18. This is a 28-year marriage. Since the parties' separation in 2008, Mr. Summer has 
resided in the home of his children from a prior relationship. Mrs. Summer resides 
the marital residence with her 84-year-old mother for whom she is a caretaker, with 
the parties' adult disabled child, who receives a social security stipend from which he 
pays the $350 per month rent, and a fourth party who is paid by Mrs. Summer's 
mother to provide some care. Mrs. Summer may benefit to the extent that her 
mother's social security exceeds the cost of her mother's medical nursing care and 
ambulance bills, and Mrs. Summer may benefit to some small extent from food 
stamps received by the fourth person living in the home. 
19. Mr. Summer's present income is $2,805 from his State of Utah retirement and social 
security. Mrs. Summer's income is presently $1,619 per month, consisting of one-
half of the Mr. Summer's State retirement, her social security, and rent from the 
parties' disabled adult son. 
20. Mr. Summer's claimed expenses were not reasonable. They were set forth in Mr. 
Summer's Trial Exhibit 1, which is his bankruptcy Petition at Schedule J. They list 
one-half of his State retirement as alimony, maintenance or support, which is wrong. 
His expenses are inflated for food, clothing, laundry and dry cleaning, transportation, 
renter's insurance, personal hair care products, services, household supplies and 
miscellaneous. He states $200 for rent and he should be entitled to rent a place to 
live in at a reasonable rental of $750, which would be $550 more than his stated 
5 
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expenses, and the rest of his expenses are at least $1,000 over what he could 
actually be paying at the present time. 
21. Mrs. Summer's monthly expenses are exceedingly reasonable. They amount to 
$2,033 per month and were set forth in the respondent's trial Exhibit 12. 
22. The parties have a marital residence located at 140 County Club, Stansbury Park, 
Utah which was valued in the recent tax notice and also valued in Schedule A of Mr. 
Summer's bankruptcy at $165,505, with approximately $114,000 owed on the 
property. Assuming the home could be sold for $165,500, the parties' equity in the 
home is approximately $50,000. 
23. Mrs. Summer is entitled to be awarded the marital residence subject to its indebtedness 
and the possessions located therein. 
24. Mr. Summer submitted Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 2, a 14-page exhibit containing a list 
of personal property he contended was left in the home when he moved out in 2008. 
Mrs. Summer denied that all of the listed property was still in her possession but 
agreed that he could have all of the personal property listed which actually was in her 
possession. 
25. Mr. Summer is entitled to be awarded all of personal property on Exhibit 2 that was 
in Mrs. Summer's possession at the time of trial. He was given ten days, 
commencing, September 9, 2010 to remove his personal property from her residence 
or he would be deemed to have forfeited any property not removed in that ten-day 
period. 
26. Because Mr. Summer never reinstated Mrs. Summer's health insurance as he had 
been ordered to do several times, Mrs. Summer is awarded a judgment requiring Mr. 
6 
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Summer pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health 
insurance terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. 
27. At the time of trial, these expenses amounted to $4,400.00. 
28. Further, Mr. Summer was found in contempt and sentenced to an additional thirty 
(30) days in jail earlier in these proceedings and because he has never complied with 
the Orders of this Court by reinstating Mrs. Summer's insurance, he still must pay the 
$1,000.00 sanction imposed the first time he was held in contempt. 
29. Mrs. Summer is awarded attorney's fees for each of the hearings detailed above, but 
each party shall bear their own attorney's fees for trial. 
30. Mr. Buhler is to prepare a Judgment along with Findings, Conclusions and an 
Attorney Fee Affidavit, serve them on Mr. Summer, and submit them to the Court 
after Mr. Summer either responds or the time to respond has expired. 
31. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the divorce Decree on the bifurcated divorce, and the 
QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in the marital residence to 
Mrs. Summer. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above. Mrs. 
Summer shall be awarded the marital residence and the possessions located therein 
under the terms and conditions stated herein and Mr. Summer shall be awarded all of his 
personal property on Exhibit 2 that was in Mrs. Summer's possession at the time of trial. 
Because of the parties' incomes, the 28 year length of the marriage, and the parties' 
expenses, Mrs. Summer is entitled to an award of alimony. However, because of Mr. 
Summer's age and income, the marital residence and the requirement that Mr. Summer 
7 
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pay Mrs. Summer's health care expenses are awards made in lieu of alimony or other 
marital support. 
I Although the parties are to bear their own fees and costs for trial, Mrs, Summer is 
i 
entitled to an award of the $6,025.50 in attorneys fees she incurred for each of the 
various hearings before trial and she shall be awarded a $4,400.00 judgment requiring 
i 
lyir. Summer to pay every health care expense incurred by her from the date her health 
ihsurance was terminated until the date that he deeds the marital property to her. 
i 
Dated Uh'f , 2010 BY THE COURT: 
1 r
 <^T^T^ 
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Approved as to Form: 
Stephen L 
Third District Coi 
v . 0/STH\°6. 4 
Jlay Kessler 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
NOTICE OF ORDER 
dteted September 23, 2010: 
Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 
! Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby 
riotified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for 
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file 
ajny written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to 
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be 
signed and filed. 
^ ^ = 1 Gary Buhler 
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GARY BUHLER (7039) 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029-0229 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-0354 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER 
Respondent. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 084300208 DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The trial before the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod on September 8, 2010 
resulted in a Memorandum Decision issued on September 15, 2010. The Court having 
reviewed the subsequent Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of Divorce hereby enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Eliery Summer, if not previously provided, shall within 10 business days of the entry of 
this order, provide to Mrs. Summer a deed to the marital home located at 140 County 
Club, Stansbury Park, Utah, conveying to her all right, title, and interest he may have 
in said real property. 
2. Eliery Summer shall pay the $1,000.00 sanction imposed the first time he was held in 
contempt on February 10, 2009. 
3. Mary Paige Summer shall provide to Eliery Summer any of his personal property as 
listed on Trial Exhibit 2, that may in the future be discovered to be in her 
possession. 
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$6,025.50 for her attorney's efforts in drafting the necessary documents before and 
after these hearings as well as the time involved in attending these hearings. 
8. Mary Page Summer is awarded judgment for her attorney's fees against Ellery Bruce 
Summer in the amount of $ Iff
 f Pl^T. . 
9. Mr. Kessler is to prepare the QDRO and the deed conveying Mr. Summer's interest in 
the marital residence to Mrs. Summer within 15 days of the entry of this decree. 
10.The total judgment against Ellery Bruce Summer shall be augmented by ongoing 
interest at the statutory post judgment rate until paid in full and by any and all costs of 
collection to include Mary Page Summer's reasonable attorney's fees at the rate 
normally and reasonably charged by her attorney at the time of the collection 
expenses. 
Dated ,2010 
Stephen L. Her 
Third District Coiift 
NOTICE OF ORDER \</£%gg 
Dated October 30, 2010: ^ ± l i £ 
Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 
Pursuant to Rule 7 the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, you are hereby 
notified that the respondent's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court for 
signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file 
any written objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to 
respondent's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be 
signed and filed. 
Arz 
Gary Buhler 
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